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Abstract 
We employ a discrete-time parametric duration model on a group of 121 countries over 
the period 1970-2011 and find that the probability of the end of financial markets’ 
shutdown and re-access falls as these events become longer. We also show that: (i) 
shutdown episodes are longer when economic prospects are poor and the degree of 
financial openness falls, the chief executive has been in office for long periods, and the 
country has a default history; and (ii) spells of re-access tend to be longer when 
economic growth improves and financial openness increases, there are neither 
government crises nor government instability, and the country did not default in the 
past. 
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1. Introduction 
Why are some countries able to access financial markets immediately after a 
default episode, while others seem to be punished and face the prospects of a long 
shutdown from the markets?  
While some works have devoted attention to investigate the question of when a 
country will re-gain markets’ access (IMF, 2001, 2003), the question of how long it will 
be shut out from financial markets once a period of default occurs has not been 
examined yet. 
Access to financial markets is important from three main reasons. First, it plays 
an important role in many countries, as several investment projects on infrastructure and 
capacity-building are typically financed via assistance from development banks, 
borrowing from international financial markets or overseas aid. Second, potential 
lenders can “keep track” of the behaviour of borrowers during default periods and 
contribute to the evaluation of whether new funds should be provided or not. Third, 
investigating this question can help designing policies aimed at guaranteeing continued 
market access for longer periods and at providing a better assessment of market-based 
borrowing. 
Despite this, sovereign defaults are not costless, and the knowledge of the period 
of markets’ shutdown and the costs associated with it can influence the decision and the 
timing of default. For instance, if the economic impact is small and the punishment is 
temporary, defaults will be more likely to happen.1 
In this paper, we use data for a sample of 121 countries over the period 1970-
2011 and rely on a discrete-time version of the Weibull duration model to: (i) test 
whether the likelihood of financial markets’ shutdown and re-access ending changes as 
                                                          
1 To witness it, many governments adopted fiscal austerity measures during the Great Recession (Agnello 
et al., 2012; Cimadomo, 2012). 
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they become longer; and (ii) to assess the impact of economic, political and 
circumstantial factors on the duration of episodes of markets’ shutdown and re-access. 
Our duration variable of interest is defined as the number of years over which a 
country is shut out from or gains re-access to (international) financial markets. 
Specifically, we consider that net negative bank or bond transfers from private creditors 
to either the public and the publicly guaranteed sector or the private sector imply a 
market shutdown. By contrast, positive net transfers denote periods of market re-access. 
Our results show that the likelihood of the end of financial markets’ shutdown 
and re-access after a certain duration falls as these events become longer. The empirical 
findings also highlight the important role that the economic growth, the financial 
openness, the political (in)stability and the default history play on the duration of 
markets’ shutdown and re-access. More specifically, markets’ shutdown episodes are 
longer when economic prospects are poor and the degree of financial openness falls, the 
chief executive has been in office for long periods, and the country has a default history. 
As for the spells of re-access to international financial markets, they tend to be longer 
when economic growth improves and financial openness increases, there are neither 
government crises nor government instability, and the country did not default in the 
past. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on the duration of financial markets’ shutdown and re-access. Section 3 
presents the econometric model and the empirical methodology. Section 4 describes the 
data and discusses the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
Why do sovereign governments avoid defaults? Traditionally, two types of 
penalties (costs) associated with default episodes have been investigated: (i) direct 
sanctions (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Fernandez and Rosenthal, 1990); and (ii) 
reputational costs (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Eaton, 1996; Cole and Kehoe, 1997). 
Direct sanctions are usually seen as an interference with current transactions either via 
denial of trade credit or seizure of foreign assets.  
Another strand of the literature emphasizes the costs of default for the domestic 
economy (Catão and Kapur, 2006). The main argument is that default causes broad 
‘collateral damage’ on the debtor’s government or its economy. 
There is also a line of investigation focusing on the determinants of public debt 
and its composition in developing and emerging countries. Claessens et al. (2007) 
highlight the importance of the country size, the fiscal burden and the quality of the 
institutional framework as having a positive effect on the development of the bond 
market. Borensztein et al. (2008) distinguish between the determinants of corporate, 
financial sector and government bond markets, and emphasize the role played by the 
lack of capital controls, the privatization of the pension system and the degree of trade 
openness.  
As can be inferred from the discussion above, the majority of the works on 
sovereign debt look at the determinants of government debt or the reasons why 
governments may want to repay their obligations, but has typically ignored the question 
about the issue of how long countries are shut out from international financial markets 
after defaulting and how (and for how long) they manage to borrow again at some point 
in the future. For instance, the seminal paper by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) argues that 
governments repay their debt because future lending depends on reputation. Arellano 
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(2008) models exclusion from international financial markets after defaulting as a 
stochastic number of periods, with re-access occurring with an exogenous probability, 
or independent of both global financial conditions and country-specific conditions. 
Lensink and van Bergeijk (1991) investigate the determinants of a country’s ability to 
access international financial markets by focusing on whether a country has undertaken 
actual borrowing. 
In this context and for the main purpose of our paper, the duration analysis gains 
an important relevance. In economics, it started to be employed to assess the duration of 
unemployment spells and business cycles or (Sichel, 1991; Zuehlke, 2003; Castro, 
2010).2 More recently, Agnello et al. (2013) make use of this analysis to assess the 
determinants of the duration of fiscal consolidation programs, while Agnello et al. 
(2015) apply it to the identification of the drivers of the duration of periods of booms, 
busts and normal times in the housing markets. Agnello et al. (2017) also rely on it to 
study the "legacy" and the "tyranny" of time on the exit and the re-entry of sovereigns to 
international capital markets. 
 
3. Econometric model 
If T measures the uncensored time of the occurrence of the event i.e. the length 
of the event in time units, then, t1, t2, …, tn represent the observed duration of the 
markets’ shutdown (or the markets' re-access).  
A particularly useful function for duration analysis is the hazard function, 
)(/)()( tStfth = , where f(t) is the density function and S(t) denotes the survivor 
function. This function measures the rate at which markets’ shutdown (re-access) spells 
                                                          
2 See Allison (1982), Kiefer (1988) and Castro (2010) for a review of the literature on economic duration 
analysis. 
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will end at time t, given that they lasted until that moment, that is, it is the probability of 
exiting from a state in moment t conditional on the length of time in that state. 
A popular functional form of the hazard function is the continuous-time 
"Weibull model", i.e. )exp()exp()(),( 10 xβxβ
−== pptthxth γ , where h0(t) is the baseline 
hazard function that captures the data dependence of duration, p parameterizes the 
duration dependence, t denotes time and measures exclusively the total length or the full 
time span of the event, γ is a constant, β is a (k×1) vector of parameters that need to be 
estimated, x is a vector of covariates, p>0 and γ>0. If p>1, the conditional probability 
of a market shutdown (re-access) ending in moment t increases as the phase gets longer, 
i.e. there is positive duration dependence; if p<1 there is negative duration dependence; 
finally, there is no duration dependence if p=1. Therefore, by estimating p, we can test 
for duration dependence in markets’ shutdown. 
However, such continuous-time framework does not allow for the inclusion of 
time-varying covariates. Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) develop a discrete-time version 
of the proportional hazards model, with the respective discrete-time hazard function 
being given by: 
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where t denotes the moment in time when the value of each independent variable is 
observed. As time is discrete, t corresponds to the amount of time (measured in years) 
during which the event has been “running" or has been "active", i.e. the amount of time 
since the beginning of the event or the time span.3 This model is equivalent to the 
                                                          
3 Countries do not experience a shutdown from (or a re-access to) international financial markets at the 
same time: sometimes, there is partial overlapping; other times, such overlapping does not occur. 
Consequently, we have different starting points for the events/spans across countries. However, over the 
sample period, several events/spans start and finish at different points in time and for different countries. 
Following Prentice and Gloecker (1978), time is assumed to take only integer values. In addition, we 
assume that n independent spells of markets' shutdown or markets' re-access starting at t=1 are observed. 
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complementary log-log (or cloglog) function, where )ln( tt h=l  represents the 
logarithm of an unspecified (baseline hazard) function of time and xit is a vector of 
time-varying explanatory variables. 
One suitable and quite popular specification for lt is the discrete-time analogue 
to the continuous-time Weibull model, which yields: 
tphtt ln)1(ln −+== αl ,           (2) 
where t where t denotes the moment in time - as time is discrete - that the value of each 
independent variable is observed.4 
Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Allison (1982) show that discrete-time log-
likelihood function for a sample of ni ,...,1=  spells can be written as follows: 
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where the dummy variable yit is equal to 1 if the shutdown from (or re-access to) the 
markets of country i ends at time t, and 0 otherwise. We estimate this model by 
Maximum Likelihood, while substituting Pij by (1) and lt by (2), which implies that the 
discrete-time log-likelihood function will be conditional on both time and the conditions 
observed for the different control variables at time t. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Such observation continues until time t+i, at which point either an event occurs or the observation is 
censored, i.e. the event is observed at t+i, but not at t+i+1. Finally, a vector of time-varying explanatory 
variables xit is also observed. 
4 Note that lt=lnht=ln(γptp-1)=α+(p-1)lnt, with α=ln(γp) and t=DurMktShutDown or t=DurMktReAccess. 
To include time-varying covariates in the discrete-time duration model, we gathered data for each 
regressor (i.e. control variable) at time (i.e. year) t. However, for lt, we measure the time since the 
beginning of the event/span. For example, if there is a market shutdown that lasts from 1991 until 2000, 
lt will be equal to 1 for 1991, 2 for 1992,…, and 10 for 2000. In practice, we identify the span/event of 
interest and compute its length/duration while, in the case of time-varying regressors, these are observed 
at each year t. This implies that, even though the beginning of a specific span/event may occur at any 
particular date, the discrete-time hazard rate of a markets' shutdown (or a markets' re-access) varies 
systematically over time instead of being arbitrary. 
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4. Data and Empirical Results 
4.1. Data 
The data used in the duration analysis consists of spells, which, in our study, 
represent the number of years of financial markets’ shutdown (DurMktShutDown). For 
each of the 121 countries included in our sample, annual data over the period 1970-2011 
on borrowing are collected from the Global Development Finance - World 
Development Indicators (GDF-WDI) database of the World Bank and used to measure 
the degree of a country’s shutdown from (or a re-access to) international financial 
markets.  
Our baseline model includes a set of economic, political and circumstantial 
variables. The economic indicators are: 
• GDP growth rate (GDP): Economic fundamentals significantly impact on 
the investment climate and low growth rates signal economic vulnerability. 
In countries experiencing adverse economic conditions, both private and 
foreign investors refrain from investing. This, combined with the increasing 
borrowing costs through syndicated loans or bond issuances, significantly 
reduce the country’s ability to borrow, forcing it to satisfy its financing needs 
less frequently via the international financial markets. The GDP series are 
obtained from the World Bank's WDI database. 
• Trade as percentage of GDP (Trade): It measures the degree of openness of 
a country. A decline in the exchanged volumes with trade partners is a 
symptom of the country's difficulty to borrow. As a result of the lack of 
confidence on the ability to repay their debt, countries could be banned from 
placing their products abroad, which leads to a collapse of exports.  
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• Financial openness (FinOpen): This is an index that measures a country's 
degree of openness of the capital account (Ito and Chinn, 2012). It codifies 
the intensity of capital controls on cross-border financial transactions based 
on the information from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). More liberalized 
financial markets should alleviate the liquidity risk and reduce the 
probability of shutdown of international financial markets for prolonged 
periods. 
The stability of the political environment may also play a key role on the timing 
and the circumstances under which countries are shut out from the markets or re-gain 
market access. To capture this effect, we have considered three indicators: 
• Years in Office (YrsOffice): It measures the number of years the chief 
executive has been in office and it is provided by the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) of the World Bank. The policy horizon of the government 
officials is an important determinant of the borrowing decision process. The 
shorter the period a chief executive expects to be in office, the more likely he 
will take actions that yield short-run benefits at the expenses of significant 
long-run costs. In particular, the immediate benefits of higher loans might 
come at the price of accepting unfavourable borrowing conditions and being 
subject to future sanctions for not repaying the debt. 
• Government crises (GovCrises): This variable counts the number of any 
rapidly developing situation that might lead to the fall of the current regime 
and remove a particular government from power with the exclusion of 
situations of revolt. It is retrieved fro the Cross-National Time-Series Data 
Archive (CNTS). Countries facing more government crises will have more 
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difficulties in terms of access to the financial markets, implying that they 
may be excluded from that access for longer periods. 
• Regime durability (RegimeDur): This variable counts the number of years 
that a cabinet has been in power, up to the current year. A cabinet that falls 
during its first year in power is counted as 1. Every time there is a 
government termination, the variable is reset to 1 the year after the 
termination. It comes from the Polity IV Database. Countries characterized 
by more stable political regimes benefit from an higher reputation at the 
international level and this makes it easier to borrow on financial markets. 
Two additional variables are used to control for circumstantial factors, namely: 
• Default history (DefaultHist): Debt repudiation generally results in a 
shutdown from the international financial markets. In particular, in the 
absence of a credible debt restructuring process (eventually supported by 
international institutions), financial markets discriminate, in terms of access, 
between defaulters and non-defaulters. To assess whether discrimination has 
long-lasting effects or not, we include a dummy variable tracking episodes of 
default. Based on the chronology of the selective default rating as compiled 
by the Standard & Poors (2013), this dummy variable takes the value of one 
during the years of default and zero otherwise. 
• IMF program (IMFProg): This is a dummy variable that controls for 
whether a country is under an agreement with the IMF (either by Stand-By 
Arrangements, Extended Fund Facilities or Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility programs) or not. It assesses the role played by the multilateral 
financial assistance provided by the IMF as a means for overcoming liquidity 
problems by facilitating the country’s access to financial markets. The 
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information about the timing of IMF-supported programs is extracted from 
the Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) database of the IMF. 
By organizing the data in spells - where a spell represents the number of years 
that a country is shut out from the financial markets (DurMktShutDown) - we are able to 
identify 561 episodes, generating 1989 observations for our discrete-time duration 
analysis.5 These descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1, where further details 
about the regressors employed in the duration analysis are also presented. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. ] 
 
Looking at the distribution of the events under investigation (Table 2), we note 
that African countries are excluded from financial markets for substantially longer 
periods than other regions. Latin American countries follow in the rank. The evidence 
for the North American region is not particularly significant given the limited number of 
countries belonging to this group. The statistics reported in Table suggest that, overall, 
re-gaining access to the financial markets is more difficult than being shut out. In fact, 
the frequency of financial markets’ shutdowns is almost three times higher than the 
frequency of market re-access. This notably applies to the African and Latin American 
economies. Interestingly, the European countries seem to be particularly resilient to 
market shutdowns. For OECD countries, the distribution of the events is substantially 
balanced with the frequency of market shutdowns being slightly higher than the 
frequency of market re-accesses. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. ] 
                                                          
5 For the duration of financial markets’ re-access (DurMktReAccess), we identify 324 spells (i.e. 684 
observations). 
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Table 3 reports the frequency of markets’ shutdown conditional on the 
occurrence of sovereign default. It suggests that defaults increase the frequency (and 
therefore, the probability) of a country being shut out from the markets. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. ] 
 
4.2. Markets’ shutdown 
The empirical evidence that emerges from the estimation of the discrete-time 
version of the Weibull model for the duration of market shutdowns is summarized in 
Table 4. The results provide strong evidence that the likelihood of a market shutdown 
ending decreases as it becomes longer (see Column 1). 
In Column 2, we allow for the effects of economic factors. The empirical 
findings show that higher GDP growth and higher financial or capital openness 
contribute to a significant decrease in the length of markets’ shutdown. However, the 
degree of trade openness is negatively related with the likelihood of markets’ shutdown 
ending. Given that the coefficient on Trade is no longer statistically significant when 
other control variables are added to the model, this indicates that the degree of trade 
openness might not be as important as GDP growth and financial openness. Columns 3 
and 4 corroborate this argument. 
In Column 3, some political variables are included in the model, but only the 
number of years the chief executive is in office has proved to influence significantly the 
duration of markets’ shutdown: the longer the chief executive is in office, the lower the 
likelihood of a market shutdown ending. This shows that a change in government might 
be necessary to create the necessary conditions to pay its loans and, ultimately, to re-
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gain access to the markets. However, no significant effects are observed in the case of 
the number of government crises and the duration of the political regime. 
Additional explanatory variables like the history of default and the external 
intervention from the IMF are considered in Column 4. The results point to the 
importance of the default history, but do not suggest a significant role for the presence 
of an IMF program.6  
Finally, in Column 5, we restrict the analysis to the regressors with significant 
coefficients. The results confirm and reinforce the importance of the economic growth, 
the financial openness, the number of years in office and the default history on the 
duration of markets’ shutdown. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE. ] 
 
4.3. Markets’ re-access 
The results for markets’ re-access are presented in Table 5 and also point to the 
fact that the longer a country has re-gained market access, the lower the likelihood of 
being excluded from it (see Column 1). 
Then, we allow for the effects of economic, political and circumstantial factors 
(Columns 2, 3 and 4, respectively). The results indicate that, to keep its access to the 
markets, the economic environment is crucial: a higher growth rate of GDP is 
negatively linked with the likelihood of a country losing its access to financial markets. 
Similarly, an increase in the degree of financial or capital openness reduces the 
likelihood of markets’ re-access ending; and, once again, Trade is not significant. 
                                                          
6 We also considered different types of programmes (extended credit facilities, stand-by arrangements and 
extended fund facilities), but no significant results were found. This empirical evidence is available upon 
request. 
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Regarding the political control variables, we observe that it is mainly the number 
of government crises that drives the duration of market re-access. More specifically, the 
higher the number of government crises in a year, the higher the likelihood of markets’ 
re-access ending. Thus, political instability makes it more difficult for a sovereign to 
obtain funding in the financial markets. 
Additionally, we find that the default history leads to a fall in the duration of 
markets’ re-access. However, no significant effects are found regarding the eventual 
gains from the implementation of an IMF programme. 
In the last regression, we restrict the analysis to those regressors that present 
significant coefficients. The results sustain the importance of economic growth, 
financial openness, government instability and default history on the duration of market 
re-access. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE. ] 
 
4.4. Robustness check 
As the economic environment – in particular, the GDP growth rate – has proved 
to be one of the most relevant factors for both the duration of markets’ shutdown and 
markets’ re-access, in this Section, we provide a more extensive analysis of the role 
played by economic growth. 
Table 6 summarizes the changes of GDP growth (on average) during the re-
access times. It shows that markets’ re-access is generally associated to a significant 
improvement in economic fundamentals. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE. ] 
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In Table 7, we distinguish between the situation where the GDP growth rate is 
higher or lower than zero and the case where the GDP growth rate is higher or lower 
than the average. We start by looking at the results for markets’ shutdown. They show 
that the positive impact of the economic growth on the likelihood of markets’ shutdown 
ending is more relevant when the growth rate is positive (Column 1), but not significant 
when the growth rate is negative. Similarly, when we consider the average growth rate 
as the threshold, we observe a statistically significant (and positive) impact only when 
the growth rate is above its mean (Column 2). 
The results are quite similar for markets’ re-access, but with the obvious 
symmetric signs. The likelihood of markets’ re-access ending decreases when the GDP 
growth rate is positive, but no significant effects are found for negative growth rates 
(Column 3). However, economic growth seems to impact in a significantly negative 
manner the duration of markets’ re-access both when the GDP growth rate is above and 
below the average. 
All in all, these findings suggest that the economic environment is particularly 
relevant when the economy is growing. This reduces the duration of markets’ shutdown 
and raises the duration of markets’ re-access. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE. ] 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we build on a database of episodes of markets’ shutdown and 
markets’ re-access, and employ a discrete-time version of a Weibull duration model 
allowing for the presence of economic, political and circumstantial effects. 
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Using data for 121 countries over the period 1970-2011, we show that the 
likelihood of the end of such episodes after a certain duration decreases the longer they 
last. 
Regarding the additional control variables, we show that economic growth, 
financial openness, political (in)stability and the default history are the main drivers of 
the duration of markets’ shutdown or markets’ re-access. 
In the one hand, markets’ shutdown episodes tend to be longer when: (i) 
economic growth and financial openness fall; (ii) the chief executive has been in office 
for long periods; and (iii) the country has a history of defaults. On the other hand, 
markets’ re-access spells are longer when: (i) economic growth and financial openness 
increases; (ii) there are neither government crises nor government instability; and (iii) 
the country does not have a history of defaults. 
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
DurMktShutDown 1989 4.18 4.07 1 30 
DurMktReAccess 684 2.24 1.70 1 11 
GDP 1898 3.53 5.31 -27.16 34.5 
Trade 1897 58.43 31.90 6.42 203.04 
FinOpen 1823 -0.44 1.27 -1.86 2.46 
YrsOffice 1715 8.04 8.13 1 46 
GovCrises 1464 0.16 0.55 0 7 
RegimeDur 1604 13.64 14.62 0 100 
DefaultHist 1340 0.43 0.49 0 1 
IMFProg 1989 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Notes: Table 1 reports the number of observations (Obs.), the mean duration (Mean), 
the standard deviation (S.D.), the minimum (Min.) and the maximum (Max.) duration 
for each spell. Similar statistics are reported for the various regressors. The data are 
annual and comprise 121 countries over the period 1970-2011. 
 
 
Table 2. Distributional analysis. 
 
Markets’ shutdown Markets’ re-access 
Region # years Frequency (%) # years Frequency (%) 
Asia-Pacific 375 37.58 148 14.83 
Latin America 543 55.07 221 22.41 
Middle-East 138 38.44 39 10.86 
Africa 800 42.9 142 7.61 
Europe 110 29.33 124 33.07 
North America 23 54.76 10 23.81 
OECD 52 41.27 44 34.92 
Total 1989 43.01 684 14.79 
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Table 3. Markets’ shutdown conditional on sovereign defaults. 
 
Markets’ shutdown conditional on sovereign defaults 
Region #years Frequency (%) 
Asia-Pacific 55 57.29 
Latin America 234 75.48 
Middle-East 26 50 
Africa 228 51.01 
Europe 18 43.9 
North America 9 100 
OECD 17 70.83 
Total 570 59.69 
 
Table 4. Duration of markets’ shutdown. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
p 0.711θ 0.719θ 0.735θ 0.721θ 0.782θ 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.074) (0.079) (0.070) 
GDP  0.035*** 0.040** 0.050** 0.047*** 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) 
Trade  -0.003** -0.002 -0.001  
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  
FinOpen  0.083** 0.139*** 0.130** 0.154*** 
  (0.039) (0.051) (0.055) (0.048) 
YrsOffice   -0.022** -0.021* -0.020** 
   (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) 
GovCrises   -0.145 -0.046  
   (0.159) (0.182)  
RegimeDur   0.006 0.006  
   (0.004) (0.004)  
DefaultHist    -0.381*** -0.336*** 
    (0.126) (0.122) 
IMFProg    -0.006  
    (0.147)  
Constant -1.004*** -0.888*** -0.907*** -0.905*** -0.959*** 
 (0.071) (0.111) (0.168) (0.270) (0.131) 
      
      
Observations 1989 1730 1138 894 1164 
Censored 480 433 272 202 269 
Log-Likelihood -1085.4 -948.7 -602.6 -451.2 -605.7 
SBIC 2186.0 1934.7 1261.6 970.4 1253.8 
LRI 0.012 0.025 0.037 0.055 0.047 
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. 
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The sign “θ” 
indicates that p is significantly lower than 1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors. 
“Censored” indicates de number of censored observations. The Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion 
(SBIC) is computed as follows: SBIC=2[-LogL+(k/2)LogN], where LogL is the log-likelihood for the 
estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is the likelihood 
ration index or pseudo-R2 (LRI=1-LogL/LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model with only a 
constant term). 
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Table 5. Duration of markets’ re-access. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
p 0.728θ 0.791θ 0.787θ 0.785θ 0.781θ 
 (0.100) (0.105) (0.120) (0.121) (0.129) 
GDP  -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.076*** -0.081*** 
  (0.014) (0.021) (0.029) (0.027) 
Trade  -0.003 -0.002 -0.004  
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)  
FinOpen  -0.037 -0.036 -0.104** -0.104** 
  (0.040) (0.048) (0.044) (0.044) 
YrsOffice   0.013 0.017* 0.016 
   (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
GovCrises   0.587*** 0.454** 0.497*** 
   (0.145) (0.180) (0.174) 
RegimeDur   0.002 0.003  
   (0.005) (0.006)  
DefaultHist    0.647*** 0.606** 
    (0.247) (0.242) 
IMFProg    0.148  
    (0.197)  
Constant -0.495*** 0.030 -0.099 -0.125 -0.212 
 (0.082) (0.164) (0.233) (0.327) (0.180) 
      
      
Observations 684 615 363 252 262 
Censored 279 261 171 124 127 
Log-Likelihood -458.7 -401.3 -235.9 -159.7 -167.2 
SBIC 930.4 834.7 519.0 374.7 373.4 
LRI 0.008 0.043 0.060 0.085 0.079 
Notes: See Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Economic growth during markets’ shutdown and re-access. 
 
 
Sample period: 1970-2011 
 
Region 
Average GDP growth 
rate during markets’ 
shutdown (A) 
Average GDP growth 
rate during markets’ 
re-access (B) 
(B)-(A) 
Asia-Pacific 4.14 6.08 1.94 
Latin America 3.45 4.41 0.96 
Middle-East 5.05 4.36 -0.69 
Africa 3.81 5.75 1.94 
Europe 2.89 5.15 2.26 
North America 3.06 5.48 2.42 
OECD 2.99 5.19 2.2 
Total 3.69 5.2 1.51 
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Table 7. Robustness check: Economic growth and markets’ shutdown/re-access. 
 
 Markets’ shutdown Markets’ re-access 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
p -0.273*** -0.269*** -0.214* -0.204 
 (0.079) (0.081) (0.119) (0.115) 
GDP>0 0.071***  -0.071*  
 (0.026)  (0.040)  
GDP<0 -0.001  -0.091  
 (0.042)  (0.084)  
GDP>mean  0.062***  -0.064** 
  (0.022)  (0.032) 
GDP<mean  0.012  -0.133** 
  (0.031)  (0.055) 
Trade -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
FinOpen 0.134** 0.135** -0.105** -0.109** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.044) (0.044) 
YrsOffice -0.022** -0.021* 0.017* 0.017* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
GovCrises -0.068 -0.071 0.459*** 0.474** 
 (0.181) (0.183) (0.178) (0.185) 
RegimeDur 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
DefaultHist -0.384*** -0.385*** 0.647*** 0.641** 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.249) (0.253) 
IMFProg 0.001 -0.007 0.139 0.092 
 (0.148) (0.149) (0.201) (0.209) 
Constant -1.022*** -0.949*** -0.142 -0.120 
 (0.286) (0.271) (0.319) (0.330) 
     
     
Observations 894 894 252 252 
Censored 202 202 124 124 
Log-Likelihood -450.4 -450.4 -159.7 -159.1 
SBIC 975.5 975.5 380.2 378.9 
LRI 0.057 0.057 0.086 0.089 
Notes: See Table 2. 
 
 
 
